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CONSTITUTIONAL VALIDITY OF OUR CONSTRUCTIVE MURDER PROVISIONS 
VAILLANCOURI and The Queen and The At:t:orney General for Ont:ario -
Supreme Court of Canada - December 1987 
The accused agreed to be a party to an armed robbery in a pool hall. The 
weapons to be used were knives. However, his partner showed up with a gun. 
The accused testified he had insisted that it be unloaded and he be given the 
ammunition. The partner removed three bullets from the gun and gave them to 
the accused. He must have left ammunition in the gun as during the robbery 
the principal partner shot and killed someone. He made a clean get-a~way but 
the accused was apprehended. Three bullets were found on him. 
The relevant law can be found in section 213 C.C . The applicable . portion of 
that section reads as follows: 
"Culpable homicide is murder where a person 
causes the death of a human being while 
committing robbery if he uses a weapon or has it 
upon his person during or at the time he commits 
the offence and death ensues as a consequence." 
There was no doubt that the accused was in on the robbery, but was he a party 
to the murder? His intent was unrelated to the murder the principal offender 
committed. Yet the accused was convicted of second degree murder as s. 21(2) 
C. C. rendered him criminally liable. He and the principal offender in 
relation to the murder, had formed an intention in common to commit an armed 
robbery and to assist each other in carrying out that common purpose. The 
principal offender committed murder in addition to the unlawful purpose (armed 
robbery) they intended to commit together. As the accused ought to have known 
the murder would be a probable consequence to an armed robbery he was not only 
a party to the armed robbery but also to the murder his partner committed. He 
was consequently convicted of second degree murder and continued to appeal 
until he ended up in the Supreme Court of Canada. 
The accused took a broad shot at the constitutionality of all the sections 
mentioned. It seems fair to say that he argued that the law reached too far 
to include him in something that was not part of what he intended. 
It is a principle of fundamental justice that the lawmakers cannot render us 
criminally liable for causing a particular result unless we at least had some 
degree of intent in respect of that result. Particularly murder, which has 
"specific intent" as an essential ingredient to be proven by the Crown, should 
not be subject to the shortcuts the Crown had in its armour for this case. 
Specific intent means that the results o f an action were specifically 
intended. In this case, it can, at best, b e said that there was a general 
intent to the unlawful act of robbery, but no intent at all in respect of the 
murder. 
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Furthermore , the "reach" by section 213 (d) and/or 21(2) C. C. violated the 
accused's right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty. This presumption 
consists of two familiar principles: 
(a) the right to remain silent, and 
(b) the burden of proof being on the Crown to prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt that which it alleges. 
In this case, the Crown needed only to prove the murder, the common intent to 
the robbery and the knowledge that the partner carried a weapon. Hence, the 
legislative reach that dragged the accused into this murder as a principal 
offender in the second deg1ee, is an evidentiary shortcut and amounts to over-
reach from a constitutional viewpoint. Consequently, the statutory 
provisions are inconsistent with the Charter of Rights and Freedoms and are as 
such without force or effect, argued the defence. 
Parliament reiterated that murder is an offence requiring specific intent when 
it enacted s. 212 C.C . which states that murder is where a person who causes 
the death of a human being means to cause that death. However, right in the 
wake of this opening statement Parliament relaxes the apparent rigidity by 
providing that where one intends and does cause bodily harm to another 
person, which he knows is likely to cause death and is indifferent whether his 
victim dies, then if death does result from the wounding, the perpetrator 
committed murder (s. 212 (a) (ii) C.C . ). In other words, the Crown does not 
have to prove i!D.Y (specific or general) intent to cause death, but only intent 
to wound. 
Then Parliament removes its elf even further from its statement t hat murder 
requires specific intent to cause death by enacting s. 212(c) C.C. It simply 
states that a person who , in the pursuit of an unlawful goal, does anything 
that he knew or should have known is likely to cause death, then even where he 
wanted to attain that goal without causing death, or any bodily harm to 
anyone, he conunits murder, if death is caused by that pursuit. 
The intent in such circumstances does not even include indifference if death 
results. All that needs to be proved is that the pursuit caused the death and 
proof of no-intent to cause death is unable to defeat. this murder provision . 
Then, of course, there is the relaxation of specific intent being prerequisite 
to conviction for murder, by means of the section (213 C.C.) that reached out 
and brought the accused within criminal liability for murder despite the fact 
he did not intend and personally did nothing to cause death to anyone despite 
the fact he intended to commit robbery with a partner who was armed with what 
he thought to be an unloaded firearm. 
This, the accused claimed, is legislative excessiveness that is inconsistent 
with his right to be presumed innocent. The Crown needed not even to prove, 
for this most serious crime we can commit, subjective foresight or even 
objective foreseeability of the likelihood of death. This foresight or 
foreseeability has been substituted by Parliament by the above explained 
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provisions which amount to statutorily constructed murder (constructive 
murder) which ignores the principles of fundamental justice. 
The Supreme Court of Canada began its deliberations by recognizing how 
Parliament has limited its supremacy by including the Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms in our new entrenched constitution. They, the appointed Judiciary, 
can by interpreting the constitution supersede the elected representatives 
whose resolves are assumed to be the will of the people. If before 1982, 
Parliament disagreed with the Judiciary' s interpretation of statute law, 
(Parliament) could supf'Y"~f'"."l"' th.~m by amending the enactment. Now, if a 
constitutional issue renders an enactment without force or effect, one way 
which Parliament can supersede the Courts is by amending the constitution. 
Considering it took Canada 55 years (from the Imperial Conference of 1927 till 
the proclamation of our constitution on April 17 of 1982) to come up with an 
amending formula for our constitution ,' any amendment to that constitution of 
ours will be a major undertaking. 
This is what the reasons for judgement record : 
"Prior to the enactment of the Charter , 
Parliament had full legislative powers with 
respect to criminal law, including the 
determination of the essential elements of any 
given crime. But, the Charter has restricted 
these powers. Under s. 7, if a conviction will 
re·sult in a deprivation of the life, liberty or 
security of the person of the accused, then 
Parliament must respect the principles of 
fundamenta l justice." 
Murde r is the worst kind of homicide. "Malice aforethought" distinguished it 
from manslaughter. The Supreme Court of Canada hastened to add that malice 
aforethought did not limit murder to premeditated causation of death. Malice 
included intentional killing (not necessarily premeditated) and implies 
recklessness (not to be confused with negligence) which means doing something 
deliberately, knowing, but being indifferent to the likely consequences of the 
act. 
Parliament in providing that causing death during the course of the commission 
of an indictable offence is included in murder, is not unique. It has been an 
historical practice. One seventeenth century author explains that "If the Act 
is unlawful, it is murder." If the glance of an arrow aimed at an animal 
belonging to another for the purpose of stealing it, kills a person who was 
out of the archer's sight, then the homicide is murder. If the animal was 
wildlife he was entitled to hunt, the killing of the person is sheer 
misadventure. A century later this was only applied if the unlawful purpose 
amounted to a serious criminal offence (felony). 
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Our section 213 C. C. is a direct descendant from that ancient common law 
except that it restricts the offenses during the commission of which the 
causation of death amounts to murder to the most serious indictable offenses 
only. As explained above, the provision is known as "constructive murder". 
England, the nation where the constructive murder provision originates, did 
away with it in 1957. In the U.S. it is widespread but losing support . 
Others have downgraded the cause of death while committing a crime to 
manslaughter and some have included a form of intent to cause the death as an 
element to the provision. 
The Supreme Court of Canada decided to strictly deal with the 
constitutionality of section (213(d) C.C.) and not with the broad attack on 
every section that releases the rule of specific intent to cause death . 
Neither would the Court deal with section (21(2) C.C.) and its alleged 
inconsistency with the Charter . This, especially as the Attorney General of 
Canada did not intervene in this appeal. However, this decision will 
undoubtedly affect those provisions. 
In this case, the accused was held criminally liable for the unintended 
results of an intended criminal act. The major question is whether that is 
inconsistent with the principles of fundamental justice. After all, s. 213 
C. C. does not call for any subjective foresight or objective foreseeability on 
the part of a person in a situation the accused found himself in . The court 
concluded that murder belongs to a category of crimes where, due to the very 
nature of it (as well as the stigma attached to a conviction and the severe 
penalty that must be imposed) conviction is unthinkable unless there is a 
criminal intent 11 reflecting the particular nature of that crime". The Court 
used theft as an example of also belonging to this category . Although it does 
not compare in terms of the gravity of the offence , it does in regard to 
requisite intent. If there was no requirement to show that the taking of 
someone else's property at least involved dishonesty then all of us would be 
unreasonably vulnerable to conviction. After all, if we were criminally 
liable for all the unintentional consequences of our acts, we could not afford 
to get out of bed in the morning. The Court, therefore, decided that if 
Parliament wants to relax the requirement of specific intent to cause death 
for the crime of murder committed during the commission of an intended 
criminal act there must, at least, be proof beyond a reasonable doubt of 
subjective foresight, meaning that the accused foresaw the results of this 
robbery and nonetheless went ahead . A lower threshold for the Crown would be 
a requirement to prove objective foreseeability, meaning that in circumstances 
where anyone could foresee the possibility of such results still proceeds with 
the intended crime. Concluded the Court: 
I 
"l will therefore, for the sole purpose of this 
appeal, go no further than say that it is a 
principle of fundamental justice that, absent 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt of at least 
objective foreseeability, there surely cannot be 
a murder conviction." 
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This means that to convict under s. 213(d) the Crown must not only prove all 
the essential elements included in the section, but also those s. 7 of the 
Charter imposes, in this case objective foreseeability. 
By enacting section 213(d) C.C. Parliament substituted for the minimum 
requirement of intent to cause death (objective foreseeability) proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt of "certain forms of intentional dangerous conduct causing 
death". In other words, the section is unconstitutional as it does not 
include as an essential element that one ought to know that death is likely to 
ensue for a conviction for murder to be possible. The current wording allows 
a conviction for murder despite the fact that a jury may have a reasonable 
doubt that the accused OUi,lit to have known that death was likely to ensue. 
Recognizing that the accused was brought into the murder offence through the 
operation of s. 21(2) C.C. which does include objective foreseeability 
(" .. ,each of them who knew or ought to have known that the commission of the 
offence would be a probable consequence ... "), s. 213 C. C. must nevertheless 
have a similar provision. It also means that the partner in a crime to be 
convicted must have a measure of intent to cause death while the principal can 
be convicted without having to prove any intent. Neither is the measure of 
deterring the use of weapons as applied in s. 213(d) C.C. "demonstrably 
justified in a free and democratic society" (see s.l Charter). If Parliament 
wants to deter such behaviour it can provide for it under the offence of 
manslaughter or the Crown can use s. 83 C.C. to prosecute. These sections 
carry sufficient maximum sentences to punish for and deter such behaviour . 
The Supreme Court of Canada concluded: 
1. -Section 213 (d) C. C. violates the principles of fundamental justice and 
the presumption of innocence (s. 7 and ll(d) of the Charter). 
2. Section 213(d) C.C . is consequently of no force or effect . 
3 . The constitutional question of s. 21(2) in combination with s. 213 (d) 
C.C. was not answered although there was an implication that the former 
does not offend the Charter. 
4. The conviction for murder must be set aside and a new trial was ordered . 
Comment: 
A new trial seems difficult in the circumstances. The very section under 
which the accused stands charged was declared without force or effect. This 
would leave one to presume that constructive murder as it existed under s. 
213(d) C.C. is no longer an offence known to law. It seems doubtful that the 
Crown, by virtue of the order for a new trial, may prosecute the accused for 
another offence that may be applicable. 
\Jhat may be of interest also, is that this decision was not unanimous. One 
justice implied that the Court has gone too far, as the narrow question they 
were entitled to address was the law as it applied to the accused. He (the 
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accused) was captured by s . 21(2) C.C. which includes objective foreseeability 
and he, therefore, had not been deprived of his right to the principles of 
fundamental justice. He further observed that the Court agreed that the crime 
deserved severe punishment and, in essence, said that the argument was not 
about the content, but rather, the wrapping of the package; it was one 
involving the label rather than the substance. He concluded that the 
judiciary should not have interfered in the Parliamentary decision reflected 
in s. 213(d) C.C. 
The Supreme Court of Canada reiterated its views on statutory provisions that 
either excuse the Crown from proving essential elements of an offence; allow 
a fact to be presumed upon the proof of other facts, or requires an accused to 
disprove on the balance of probabilities an essential element of the offence. 
In all of these, the accused must create more than a reasonable doubt to rebut 
what may be presumed. These provisions clearly violate the presumption of 
innocence and the principle of fundamental justice that any reasonable doubt 
must be resolved in favour of the accused. 
What is also of interest is that the Court held : 
"Section 7 and ll(d) will also be infringed 
where the statutory definition of the offence 
does not include an element which is required 
under s. 7." 
In this case, that was an intent of at least objective foreseeability . 
Principles of law have always been applied to interpret the statutes. If our 
constitution requires that there must be an intent related to causing death in 
s. 213 C.C., why could the Court not simply have left the section operable and 
set the precedent that intent is, by principle of law, an essential element. 
Many enactments are interpreted differently since the Charter came into 
effect. 
LAVIOLEJTE v. The Queen - Supreme Court of Canada 
The accused and two companions broke into a parish house to find things to 
steal . He had handed, upon the request of one of his companions, a steel pipe 
to him when they entered the house. When the parish priest awakened by the 
noise, ca.me out of his room the chap with the pipe "beat him to death". This 
fellow plead guilty to second degree murder while the accused and the other 
perpetrator were also convicted of that crime upon a joint trial. 
The Prince Edward Island Supreme Court ordered new and separate trials for the 
duo and the Crown appealed this decision to the Supreme Court of Canada. The 
issues in this appeal were identical to those in the Vaillancourt case. 
Needless to say, the Crown was not successful and new trials were ordered. 
- 7 -
Comment: 
I have kept track of and been preoccupied with the principles, and doctrines 
of our criminal law. Despite this obsessive immersion having made me 
understand the need for the safeguards and principles contained in these 
legal philosophies and theories, I have never become accustomed to the 
apparent callousness of our Courts. 
The kernel of the horrendous criminal act involved here gets no more than 
"Stephen beat · him to death with the pipe" in among pages and pages of 
reasoning and examining how the system victimizes those the court found to be 
responsible for the crime. I do perfectly understand how I may arouse the 
wrath of those who will correctly point out that heinousness of the crime 
should not make the person(s) accused of committing it any more vulnerable to 
conviction than those who conunit a crime of lesser gravity; that dramatization 
by the court may make one doubt the requisite impartiality and absence of bias 
on the part of those sitting in judgment; etc. 
I full well realize that the public will 
judgement. If they did, a different tone may 
level of acceptable reputation with reasonable 
not likely read reasons for 
well be necessary to maintain a 
lay persons. 
To preserve this reputation we have gone as far as expanding the meaning of 
the blindfold on the goddess of justice to not only depict impartiality, but 
also deliberate blindness to facts. Surely, if we can go to that extent in 
terms of the application of law, we can make a bit more of an effort in the 
cosmetic end of things and show some sensitivity for those who experienced 




The Queen v. ZACHARIAS - B.C. Court of Appeal -
Victoria V000096 - November 26, 1987 
We continue to enforce the tenor of law that "thou shall have faith in being 
tried by thy peers". This mode of trial initiated in our system in 1215 by 
means of the Magna Carta continues to be the holiest of holy in the 
administration of justice. Questioning its validity in contemporary society 
is still the equivalent of speaking out against motherhood in the hallways of 
the maternity ward. Our laws, which strictly prohibit any revelations of what 
went on in the jury rooms, appear like evidence of willful blindness that 
verdicts may be reached by duress, the strong minded intimidating their 
lessers, or in ignorance of the law despite what must appear to them 
ramblings and renditions of law known as judicial instructions to the jury. 
The laws even prevent research to explore the validity of the system. For 
instance, tests of jury members on how well they understood the judicial 
instructions may be revealing, particularly when the instructions have, in 
terms of time, gone well beyond the average human attention span. Tests done 
on students exposed to a hypothetical address to a jury, or those who were 
specifically (in the U.S.) asked to sit through an entire trial and were 
subjected immediately upon the address to · the jury to oral and written tests 
on their understanding of the instructions given to the jury, are claimed to 
have attained marks not exceeding 35%. This is not embarrassing to the 
reasonable and intelligent citizens who make up our juries . Most competent 
judges are sometimes told by more superior courts that they have erred in 
law. Considering the current complexities of that law which the jury must 
apply to find fa~ts and determine a verdict, it is no affront to say to our 
peers that thei)' are no longer competent or qualified to render a verdict. 
Whenever the system permits a peek behind the screens surrounding juries there 
is evidence of unawareness of the law. \Jhen we "fly" without a jury the 
system crosses all T's, and dots all I's meticulously to ensure flight. When 
we "fly" with a jury we are equally as meticulous except we do not carry out 
the inspections to ensure airworthiness. 
In this case, Mr. ZACHARIAS was tried before a jury, with defrauding his 
employer, a Credit Union. After conviction defence counsel had a visit from 
the jury's foreman. Information from credit union personnel, (conveyed other 
than by means of testimony), who had worked under the accused's supervision, 
had left the impression with the jury that the accused had been convicted of 
similar fraud elsewhere and that he was a hard and mean man to work for. In 
general, the message was that he was a person likely to commit the offence for 
which he was being tried. Defence counsel went with this allegation of 
obstructing, perverting or defeating justice (s. 127(2)C.C.) to the Crown. 
This resulted in the R.C.M.P. and a senior lawyer conducting an investigation. 
Jury members were interviewed and questioned by the lawyer. Under s. 576.2 
C.C. they were excused for disclosing "information relating to the proceedings 
of the jury". The answers given by the jurors did not support the suggestion 
that someone had influenced them. 
- 9 -
The second ground for appeal was that the investigation revealed that the jury 
was hung and that they laboured under the misconception that they needed to 
deliberate at least one or two weeks before the court would accept that they 
could not unanimously decide on a verdict. The foreman described a scene of 
considerable tension among the jury members. (He was the one holding out on 
unanimity). He had been continuously reminded: 
" 'Look we've got families to get back to, and 
we've got this to get to, and I want to get back 
to work', and, you know, how can you, you know, 
eleven pccpl~ b~ ~~ong and one person be right; 
and, you know, 'it's going to be two - we're 
going to have to wait a week or two weeks before 
they term it a hung jury; look it, Bob, what the 
hell is going on?' , and I basically hung out 
until 11:45 and I could see nobody was going to 
change their mind; nobody was going with me and 
like a damn fool I voted guilty just to get them 
off my back." 
This, and other statements made about what was going on with the jury, caused 
the B. C. Court of Appeal to remind the parties to the proceedings that the 
investigation into the second ground of appeal was highly inappropriate. The 
jury members were not exempt from disclosing this information as it did not 
relate to the allegation of obstructing justice. 
The B.C. Court of Appeal said that the disclosures by the jurors 
true and that the verdict of guilty had probably resulted 
misconception of a hung jury and the courses open to them. 
"As this is all attributed to the Attorney's 
General interrogation of jurors in breach of s. 
576. 2, I think the Crown is in no position to 






Yarning that the peculiarities of this case stripped it of any precedent -
setting value for probing j ury's deliberations in other cases, the Court 
ordered a new trial. 
Appeal allowed 
New trial ordered. 
- 10 -
THE OFFENCE OF TIIREATENING 
Regina v. SAULNIER - The County Court of Cariboo -
Prince George 10524, July 1987 
The accused had his truck repaired and discovered that the bill exceeded the 
estimate he received. A dispute arose over an outstanding amount and a 
private bailiff went to the accused's residence to seize the truck. The 
bailiff was armed with a distress warrant under the Repairer's Lien Act but 
was met with extreme hostility when he served the document on the accused. A 
detailed description would leave the reader with the impression that the 
accused had gone berserk. He, despite strong advice to the contrary, moved 
the truck from the street on to his property. When the bailiff followed with 
his vehicle the accused swung at him and his partner with a crowbar. He then 
ordered the bailiff off his property while continuing the threatening 
gestures. The bailiff complied and called police who arrested the accused 
"because of their concern that a breach of the peace might occur". On their 
way to the police station the accused continued his verbal hostility. About 
the garage who repaired his truck, the accused said to the officers (when they 
suggested he try to settle his dispute with them civilly). "Fuck that. I' rn 
going to take a baseball bat down there and kill the cocksuckers." When asked 
where the garage was situated he responded: "Follow me after you let me out 
of gaol. I'm going down to kill those fuckers ... etc." The accused was 
charged with possession of a weapon (the crowbar) dangerous to the public 
peace and with uttering a threat (s. 243.4.C.C.). 
With regard to the first charge the accused claimed that the bailiff was a 
trespasser and that he had a right under sections 38,39 and 41 C.C. to use as 
much force as was necessary to remove the bailiff. The County Court held the 
crowbar was, in the circumstances, a weapon and that the bailiff had lawful 
possession of the truck, and therefore, the accused's possession was not 
peaceable. His behavior had amounted to endangering the public peace or the 
normal state of society. Furthermore, he had used the crowbar beyond what was 
necessary to remove an unwanted intruder. He was convicted. 
In regards to the threatening, the County Court Judge said that the section 
was clear and that the gravamen of the offence is the making of a threat 
that was intended to cause alarm. The Judge saw nothing in the section that 
required the Crown to prove that there was an intent on the part of the 
accused to carry out the threat or that it be passed on to the intended 
victim. 
Accused found guilty on both counts . 
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Comment: 
The Court did not review the history of section 243.4 C.C. The section used 
to be s. 331 C.C. in Part VII of the criminal code which deals with "Offences 
against rights of property." In 1985 it was amended and included in Part VI 
of the code which deals with "Offences against the person and reputation". 
The original wording of the offence section ~: 
331. "Everyone commits an offence who by letter, 
telephone, cable, radio, or otherwise, 
utters, conveys or causes any person to 
threat. 
(a) to cause death or injury to any 
person, or 
(b) to burn, destroy or damage real or 
personal property, or 
(c) to kill, maim, wound, poison or inJure 
an animal or bird that is the property 




There have been some interesting cases under this section. In one B. C. case a 
person charged with impaired driving in the pre-breathalyzer days went to the 
police station a few days later and said he would kill the physician who had 
given him a sobriety test. He did not request that the message be passed on 
to the doctor, he simply made the statement with such apparent conviction that 
he was arrested and charged under the above-quoted section. 
The B.C. Court of Appeal gave lengthy reasons for judgment. The Crown had, in 
terms of the uttering and conveying of the threat relied on the word 
"otherwise" to bring the accused's actions within the section. The Court 
concluded that the tenor of the section, particularly due to the words "by 
letter, telegram ... etc.", indicated that parliament intended to create an 
offence for alarming a person by threatening him. The offender rs intent I 
therefore, had to be that he wished the threatened person to receive the 
threat. Another element (although not essential) was the perpetrator hiding 
his identity to amplify the devastation on the recipient of the threat. At 
least, the offence included the passing on of the threat to the intended 
victim. Whether or not there was any intent to carry out the threat was 
irrelevant to the offence Parliament created. Causing another person to live 
in fear on account of threats was what the section intended to prohibit. 
The Supreme Court of Canada seemed to take a similar approach to interpreting 
this section when it, in 1974, gave reasons for judgment in R.V. Mabis (6 'WWR 
304). Mabis had spotted in a pub, a person who had recently testified against 
him. He had gone to this person and said: "Now I got you where I want you, I 
am going to kill you." The Court held that the section strongly implied that 
simply uttering a threat, face to face is not covered und.er this section. 
Also, the offender had to go beyond simple uttering and had to intend to have 
the message conveyed. ("Already proceeded from words to deeds and thereby 
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manifested his resolve . ") The Court suggested that the definition of assault 
(which includes threats) was better suited for face-to-face confrontations. 
Since 1985 the section reads: 
s. 243. 4 "Everyone commits an offence who , in 
any manner knowingly utters, conveys 
or causes any person to receive a 
threat (a) " ... etc. (as above, with 
the exception of an insignificant 
change in wording of (c))." 
As indicated in the "note" following this section in Martin's Annual Criminal 
Code 1988, the judicial decisions made in respect to the old section apply to 
the new one. The tenor in terms of having the threat conveyed to the intended 
target and that the gravamen of ·the offence is to alarm the target and not 
just to utter the threat, still seem the same. 
In view of all this, one wonders if the conviction of Saulnier, the unhappy 
truck owner, would stand up if appealed further. In view of the ruling by the 
B.C. Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court of Canada under the old section and 
the new section seemingly having the same object, this County Court's liberal 
and broad interpretation of the sections may not stand. 
Another aspect of this case was the arrest made by the officers. It is 
indicated that they did so to prevent a breach of the peace and were entitled 
to maintain custody of Mr. SAULNIER as long as there were grounds for 
believing there would be a breach of the peace if they released him. Mr. 
Saulnier supplied an abundance of grounds for that belief. Despite the fact 
that sections 30 or 31 C.C. seem not to include powers to arrest to prevent a 
breach of the peace, a decision by the B.C. Court of Appeal in a civil suit 
for false imprisonment*, made it clear that at common law, (prevention being a 
duty) prevention of such a breach is included. 
Finally, the legal status of the private bailiffs in this case is of interest. 
It was also an issue not addressed in this case other than a ruling by the 
County Judge that the bailiff who found the truck parked on the road in front 
of the accused's home "took possession" of the truck and prepared a notice of 
seizure. That is when the fireworks started. The Bailiff continued his 
attempt to seize the truck and went onto the accused's property. If the 
accused had no right under the well known sections to protect his property he 
did in fact by his very threatening gestures with a crowbar assault the 
bailiff. The County Court Judge held that the bailiff acted lawfully and was 
justified in aggressively pursuing the seizure despite the fact that the owner 
and possessor of the truck refused to part with the property. 
* Hayes v. Constables Thompson and Bell - Volume 20, page 4 of this 
publication . 
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An interesting case on this point was decided by the Ontario Court of Appeal 
* . in 1960 . A Mr. Doucette had purchased a T.V. set on payments. When he was 
in default the lienholders went to a private bailiff and signed a distress 
warrant. The bailiff, with the assistance of police, overcame the resistance 
by Mr. Doucette and carried away the T.V. set. Mr. Doucette was charged with 
assaulting the bailiff as a person in the lawful execution of a process 
against goods (s. 118 C.C.). The Ontario Court of Appeal explained that the 
private bailiff in the circwnstances is no such person. The Court ruled that 
section 118 C. C. only refers to persons who execute a Court order, but not 
those who act on the instructions of a private party who claim a legal 
interest in property. The court explained that when a private bailiff is told 
by the possessor that he disputes the claim, then he is to leave. A tug-of-
war on the spot is not a means of settling such a dispute; the c~urtroom is 
the appropriate place. The criminal law does not extend protection to those 
who wish to lay claim to property in someone else's possession. A private 
bailiff acting on the part of another person, has no special status and when 
he is told to leave and refuses, he is a trespasser. Section 39(1) C.C. seems 
to indicate the same views in law. It states that the possessor may defend 
his possession under a claim of right even if the other party was entitled by 
law to possession. 
The views of the Ontario Court of Appeal have had a wide following in Canada. 
Since writing the above, the reasons for Judgment in Regina v. Underwood were 
distributed. This was a judgment by the County Court of Vancouver Island 
(Victoria 42921) rendered in December of 1987. 
Underwood was charged with knowingly uttering a threat to his girlfriend who 
he was living with "off and on". When things were not so good between them 
she wanted him "out", but he declined to go. The scenario that resulted was 
him laying on the chesterfield while his girlfriend and her sister- in-la1'l 
argued with him from the kitchen. At one point the accused said to his 
girlfriend, without changing his bodily position; "If you don't shut your 
mouth I' 11 stick a knife into you and you will shut up." This frightened the 
sister-in- law who alerted the police. The charge of threatening resulted. 
There were no threatening gestures and there was no evidence of anyone having 
been drinking. The question was whether the Crown had made out a case under 
the new section in thi s ''face to face" threat where the violence was 
exclusively verbal . 
This County Court Judge did review the Nobis decision by the Supreme Court of 
Canada and applied various aspects of it to this Underwood case. However, 
without giving reasons for this conclusion the court said: 
* 
"Parliament has now determined that oral face to 
face threats in fact constitute a crime." 
R v. DOUCETIE et al (1960) 129 C.C.C. 102 
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The· Supreme Court of Canada had held that the old section did not prohibit 
such an act because "countless are those who do not weigh their words . " 
The County Court Judge in this case recognized that fact as a dilemma for the 
Courts and held that consequently mens rea at the time the threat was uttered 
is now an essential ingredient to the offence the new section creates. The 
circwnstances surrounding the giving of an oral threat must be considered to 
determine if such mens rea was present . 
Said the Court: 
" only tho~P. threats that are intended to be 
taken seriously are covered by the (new) 
section." 
The Crown had failed to prove that the words admittedly spoken by the accused 
were demonstrating a rea l intent to actually threaten his girlfriend. 
Accused acquitted 
Note : 
Obviously, this County Court Judge does not agree that judicial decisions made 
under the old section apply to the new definition of the crime of threatening. 
Also note that in R. v. Howlett (See page 28 of this volume) the B.C. Court of 
Appeal never questioned the propriety of including a face to face threat in 
this offence . Neither did the defence raise the issue. 
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•coNSTITUTIONALITY OF PRIVACY ACT ALLOWING UNIIATERAL 
CONSENT TO INTERCEPT A PRIVATE COMMUNICATION" 
Regina v. WIGGENS - Supreme Court of B.C. - Vancouver, B.C . 
No . CC851985 - May 1987 
The accused approached a Mr. S and asked his participation in importing 
hashish into Canada. S went to the R.C.M.P. who supplied S with a "bodypack" 
and intercepted with his specific consent, the conversations he (S) had with 
the accused. The conversation was transmitted and simultaneously recorded by 
the R. C. M. P. At his tri<> l. fnr l'."onspiracy to import a narcotic, the accused 
served notice (under the provisions of the Constitutional Question Act) on the 
Federal and B.C. Attorneys General challenging the consitutional validity of 
the Criminal Code's "Invasion of Privacy" provisions that -
(1) render interceptors in these circumstances immune, 
(2) allows one person to unilaterally consent to the infringement of another 
person ' s right to privacy (after all, one person in a communication with 
two or more persons can, by himself, consent and thereby deprive others 
from that right), and 
(3) that this one person can also consent to the admission of the 
conununication in evidence that may well be against the others . 
When the Charter of Rights and Freedoms came into effect, it was predicted 
that it (specifically s. 8 - "unreasonable search and seizure") would not 
apply to intercepting private communications. It has long since been conceded 
that the Charter does apply and that such an interception is a search and 
seizure. All se·arches and seizures that are warrantless are by their very 
nature unreasonable said the Supreme Court of Canada in 1984*. Therefore, 
the interception if allowed without authorization (as long as one participant 
consents) is as unconstitutional, argued the defence, as the provision in the 
then Combines Investigation Act which allowed searches that were in essence 
warrantless. 
What is of interest in thi s case, is that there was general agreement that, in 
view of the definitions of "intercept" and "private communication" there would 
have been no argument if S . had simply taped the conversation. It was the 
simultaneous transmission to and interception by a third party that brought 
the matter within the "Invasion of Privacy" provisions, some of which were 
constitutionally challenged in this case. 
The Crown argued that Parliament's consent for this sort of interception 
(search) renders these warrantless searches reasonable. The defence 
responded that Parliament cannot guarantee, by means of entrenched 
constitutional law, that we have certain rights and then take them away with 
ordinary legislation. Furthermore, the Constitution says that where 
Parliament's laws are inconsistent with the constitution that law, in as far 
as it is inconsistent, shall be without force or effect. That is the supreme 
law. 
* Hunter v. Southam Incorporated, Volume 18, page 12 of this 
publication - and (1984) 14 C.C.C. (2d) 97. 
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Another issue is the Supreme Court of Canada's ruling that s . 8 of the Charter 
does not guarantee an absolute protection, but only where there is a 
reasonable expectation of privacy. Furthermore, by means of judicial licence 
(authorization) the rights of the undividual must give way to the public 
interest which justifies the encroachment by law enforcement. 
Our privacy provisions are very similar to those in the U.S. They also have a 
provision in their laws that one person can by his consent deprive others from 
a privacy the constitution guarantees them by means of its Fourth Amendment. 
Consequently, it makes sense to discover how they resolved this issue which 
was kernel in some major cases. The U.S. Supreme Court in essence concluded: 
"Vlhat is the difference?" 
If an agent had a direct conversation with the accused and records it in his 
notebook afterwards, it is perfectly permissible for the agent to relate that 
conversation to the Court. The same goes for recording the conversation 
s imultaneously to it taking place. Said the U.S. Supreme Court: 
"If the law gives no protection to the wrongdoer 
whose trusted accomplice is or becomes a police 
agent, neither should it protect him when that 
same agent has recorded or transmitted the 
conversations which are later offered in 
evidence to prove the State ' s case. " (Emphasis 
is mine). 
"Nor should we be too ready to erect 
constitutional barriers to relevant and 
probative evidence which is also accurate and 
reliable. An electronic recording will, many 
times, produce a more reliable rendition of the 
unaided memory of a police agent." 
The U.S. Court concluded that if the Fourth Amendment does not protect anyone 
from having his conversation repeated in testimony by unaided memory, then how 
could that Amendment prevent the admission of a far more reliable version of 
that conversation. Vlhen we share our wicked plots with others, them 
testifying against us is a risk we take. 
The U.S. Supreme Court, for instance, ruled admissible the taped conversation 
in which a citizen offered a revenue agent a bribe for a favourable audit. 
Despite the strong and unambiguous language by the Supreme Court of Canada in 
1984. (Hunter v. Southam), the interception with the consent of S fell short 
of breaching s. 8 of the Charter, said the B.C. Supreme Court Justice . Also 
here, it is impossible to distinguish between the "no live" or "live" 
monitoring by police. 
Application by accused was dismissed. Conversation was ruled to be admissible 
in evidence. 
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NO GREATER FAVOUR CAN BE AFFORDED A SUSPECT THAN 
TO VIOI.ATE HIS RIGHTS OR FREEDOMS 
Regina v. OLSON - B.C. Court of Appeal - CA 007379 
October 1987 
The accused accompanied a police officer and supplied breath samples on 
demand. No arrest was effected and the accused was not made aware that he had 
a right to retain and instruct counsel without delay. 
At h is trail for impaired driving he attempted to have all of the evidence 
suppressed on account of the infringement of his right to counsel. However, 
the accused testified and it was disclosed that he was a store detective and 
was quite experienced in detaining people. He even had a Charter warning card 
in his wallet and he conceded to have not only an awareness of the definition 
of detention, but also had a reasonable understanding of the possible 
consequences if a suspect's right to counsel is infringed. \..Then asked why he 
had not phoned a lawyer and exercised his right the accused responded: 
"Strictly for the fact that I was very well 
aware that you have to be read your rights, 
like, that is part of the law." 
The trial judge had concluded that the accused had deliberately not wanted to 
deprive himself of the potential defence he raised at trial . Therefore, 
admitting the evidence despite the infringement of the accused's right, would 
not bring the administration of justice into disrepute. This issue ended up 
before the B.C. Court of Appeal. 
The accused relied heavily on the Therens decision by the Supreme Court of 
Canada* which establishes that an infringement of right to counsel 
automatically renders evidence that a person by law is compelled to provide, 
inadmissible. Acceptance of the evidence in the circumstances, would in view 
of that compulsion always bring the administration of justice into disrepute, 
argued defence counsel. However, this Olson case was distinct from Therens 
held the Court as it was a proven fact that the accused, Olson, was aware of 
his right far beyond what the Charter warning would have accomplished . 
Comment: 
Although the circumstances are unique and interesting, the judgment does not 
seem to be too much of a trend-setter. Some may read too much into the 
Court's reasons. Please note that the court did not say that where the 
detainer knows the detainee to be aware of his rights to counsel he need not 
inform him of that right. The Court only said that in view of the proof, the 
administration of justice would not be brought into disrepute by admitting the 
* See Volume 21, page 21 of this publication or 18 C.C.C . (3d) 481 . 
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evidence despite the infringement of the accused's rights. Unless our Courts 
hold that awareness is the objective of s. lO(b) of the Charter (and that 
informing a detainee is only a means to that end) could it be said that 
failing to inform an aware detainee is not an infringement of this Charter 
right. Such ruling is not in the cards and could create greater problems than 
preventing the absurdity of reading Charter rights to, for instance , a legal 
expert. 
* * * * * * 
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ROAD CHECKS - RANDOM STOPPING OF CARS FOR INSPECTION 
OF DOCUMENTS - ARBITRARY DETENTION 
Regina v. LADOUCEUR - 35 C.C.C. (3d) 240 
Ontario Court of Appeal 
Two municipal constables in Ontario randomly stopped motor vehicles to check 
driver's licences and inspect ownership and insurance documents. The accused 
had quite a driving record and was in the habit of driving whether his licence 
was suspended or not. The officers were totally unaware of this and the 
accused's driving was normal and within the law when they decided to stop him , 
It was discovered that his driver's licence was suspended for non-payment of 
traffic fines. He was issued a swnrnons ticket under the Highway Traffic Act. 
There were no warnings or reading of rights, no suggestions of arrest. When 
asked for his licence he simply told them the status of the document. Th<: 
entire contact was over in approximately 10 minutes. The accused's lawyer 
agrees that in terms of behaviour, and in treatment of the accused, nothing 
improper or underhanded h appened. There was no suggestion that anything 
untoward took place between the accused and the officers. 
The accused appealed his 
constitutional arguments . 
be weighty is reflected 
found that the Crown came 
conviction for driving while suspended strictly on 
That this Court of Appeal considered this matter to 
in the granting of a one year adjournment when it 
inadequately prepared to argue its position . 
Like all provincial traffic statutes, and police acts the Ontario statutes 
provide that: 
1. no one shall drive without or with a suspended driver's licence; 
2. every driver must carry his driver's licence, registration and insurance 
documents with him and shall surrender them for the purpose of 
inspection to a constable; 
3. a constable may require a motorist to stop who shall inunediately come to 
a safe stop; 
4. a constable shall apprehend offenders and cause proceedings to be 
conunenced against them; and 
5. the enforcement officers have been given power to enforce the doing of a 
prohibited act or thing, and such power is given as is necessary to 
enable the person, officer or functionary to enforce the doing of such 
act or thing. 
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The Crown argued that the statutes explicitly and implicitly gave the officers 
the powers to do as they did. Explicitly under the statutes and implicitly by 
common law.* These powers are granted for the protection of the public 
welfare and the laws authorizing the officers to act must therefore be given a 
broad, fair, and liberal interpretation to best assure the attainment of that 
protection. 
The defence had not much of an argument with the Crown's position but 
submitted that the officers only have those powers when they have "reasonable 
grounds for believing that unlawful behaviour has occurred or is. taking 
place." The Charter of Rights and Freedoms has now placed a restriction on 
those powers. If reasonah1P. ~rounds are not pre-requisite to exercising those 
powers the enactments would be without force or effect as they fly in the face 
of the supreme law which guarantees among other things: 
1. that we shall have the right to life, liberty and security of the 
person and shall not be deprived of this right other than by the 
principles of fundamental justice; 
2 . that we have a right to be secure against unreasonable search and 
seizure; and 
3. that we have a right not to be arbitrarily arrested or detained. 
Reasonable limits to thes e rights and freedoms may be prescribed by law onl v 
where that is demonstrably justified in our free and democratic society. (S.l 
Charter). 
The defence argued that the laws supporting the officers' actions are not 
reasonably justified unless the courts make them subject to the officers 
having reasonable grounds for believing an offence has or is taking place. 
The Crown argued that no such prerequisite ought to be created. If the 
enactments are inconsistent with what the Charter guarantees then they amount 
to reasonable limitations to the rights mentioned above and are demonstrably 
justified in our fallible though free and democratic society. 
The Ontario Court of Appeal held that section 9 of the Charter is at the heart 
of this issue. It guarantees the right not to be arbitrarily detained. The 
questions to be answered are whether there is detention when a driver is 
stopped by police and if, in this case, that detention was arbitrary. 
In belabouring the definition of detention the court turned to the leading 
post-Charter case decided by the Supreme Court of Canada in 1985** One 
description of detention was when a police officer assumes control over a 
person in circumstances that may have significant legal consequences ... Mr. 
Therens was found to be impaired by alcohol. Needless to say the above 
* 
** 
Supreme Court o f Canada. R. v. DEDHAN - 20 C.C.C. (3d) 97. Also 
see Volume 22, page 17 of this publication. (Road blocks for 
impaired drivers). 
R. v. THERENS, 18 C. C. C. (3d) 481. 
this publication. 
Also see Volume 21 , page 1 of 
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description applied to him. As police had not noticed anything amiss with Mr . 
Theren's car or driving it was inescapable that: 
" ..... in essence, the police stopped and 
detained the appellant arbitrarily to 
investigate whether he might be committing a 
criminal offence." 
said the Supreme Court of Canada in 1985. 
The: Supreme Court of Cc1uaua in 1986* also gave some guidance on the test 
whether a law that is found to be inconsistent with the Charter is a 
reasonable limit to its provisions. (This is the case where this Court 
declared s. 8 of the Narcotic Control Act to be without force or effect). The 
Court held that the party seeking to uphold the limitation of a Charter right 
or freedom must demonstrate justification for this upon preponderance of 
probabilities. To do this the party (nearly all of the time The Crown) must 
show that the objectives for the limitation "relates to concerns that are 
pressing and substantial in a free and democratic society." That is the first 
step. The second one is to show that the law in question has a rational 
connection to the objective; does minimally impair the right or freedom, and 
is proportionate in terms of its purpose and effects. Therefore, a broad "go 
ahead and do it". or "catch all" provision is not likely to pass this test 
regardless of its noble objective. 
This brought the Ontario Court of Appeal to examine mankind and its 
automobiles; the bighway as the human abattoir where we need protection from 
ourselves and the actions of others. 
Crown counsel submitted that his learned friend's argument that a motorist 
should not be stopped unless the officer has observed something that gives him 
reason to do so would defeat the law maker's obligation to make the highways 
as safe as possible. The human suffering resulting from malfunctioning 
vehicles, unqualified drivers, and impairment are so immense and voluminous 
that the random stop to prevent and detect these is very minor by comparison. 
By the time these things become "observable from the outside" it is often too 
late. Accidents are frequently the scenes where such mechanical and 
competence flaws become apparent. 
Surely if, for the purpose of collecting taxes, we make spot audits of 
business or personal books (where we are obliged to explain and make 
statement) we can justify spot checks of our vehicles (during which we need 
not to be searched or make any statements) submitted Crown Counsel. 
In Canada there is one suspended driver for every 37 driving on our highways. 
There are an average of 13,000 convictions per year of. unlicensed drivers who 
cause the greater proportion of accidents which are on average more serious 
than those caused by licensed drivers; and the uninsured cause nearly two and 
* R. v. OAKES, 24 C. C.C . (3d) 321. Also see Volume 23, page 16 of this 
publication. 
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one-half times more personal injury accidents than the insured drivers. 
However, the Crown's data also showed a decrease in accidents and convictions 
over the years preceding 1985 and failed to demonstrate that the random stops 
by police had anything to do with this decrease or any comparison of charges 
resulting from such stops and those preferred on discovery of offences by 
other means. Consequently, the Crown failed to meet its burden to 
demonstrate that the random stop procedure is a reasonable limit of the right 
not to be arbitrarily detained. 
The Ontario Court of Appeal then turned to U.S. Juris prudence. Although its 
constitution does not contain a right not to be arbitrarily detained, the 
issue is dealt with under their fourth amendment which is more or less the 
counterpart of our s. 8 of the Charter (unreasonable search and seizure). 
Their spot check is simply considered to be a search. Unbridled discretion to 
stop anyone at whim is considered excessive and unconstitutional in the U.S. 
Therefore, random stopping of vehicles be it for traffic rules, wildlifr 
checks or agricultural or environmental purposes, is a consitutional taboo. 
Reasonable grounds are a prerequisite to stopping vehicles. 
The Ontario Court of Appeal concluded that "purely random stopping power" 
infringes s. 9 of the Charter and cannot be considered as a reasonable limit 
to the right guaranteed under that section. However, the sections of the 
Highway Traffic Act that grant such powers were not declared to be without 
force or effect. The law is valid but not to be used by police officers 
except upon the basis of some reasonable, articuable or some other basis that 
accords with the provisions of the Charter. The Ontario traffic laws do 
stipulate that the power to stop vehicles must be exercised in the officer's 
lawful execution of his duties and responsibilities . 
Consequently, the evidence that the accused drove while under suspension was 
obtained by a means that infringed his Charter rights. Admitting the evidence 
could, in the circumstances, bring the administration of justice into 
disrepute. However, the accused must show on the balance of probabilities 
that that is so. He failed to do that and therefore the fact that his licence 
was suspended should not be excluded . 
Accused's Appeal was dismissed . 
Note: 
Road checks for impaired drivers as part of an organized and announced program 
is not affected in Ontario due to the Supreme Court of Canada decision in 
Regina v. Dedman. There is also enough room in this judgment to say that 
where something becomes problematic and affects public safety and interest, 
road checks may be proper if they are part of an organized and announced law 
enforcement effort. In the U.S. this would not likely be possible due to the 
distinction in the status of the officer there from his Canadian counterpart. 
However, that is a separate topic. Also note that this decision is not 
binding on B.C. Courts. The closest we (in B.C.) come to decide on this was 
in the BONOGOFSKI case - see Volume 29, page 1). 
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ADMISSIBILITY OF STATEMENT - WAIVER OF RIGHT TO COUNSEL 
Regina v. Johnscon - County Court of Westminster - New Westminster 
X017902 - August 1987 
The accused, a man in his mid-twenties, was, due to mental retardation ranked 
in the bottom 6%. of the I .Q. level for the general population. He allegedly 
committed sexual assaults upon two children. The information was passed onto 
the police in the location where the accused resided, for the accused to be 
interviewed. This information included the name of the accused' s lawyer and 
the fact that he did not want the accused interviewed unless he was present. 
The police officer assigned to question the accused gave him the proper 
warnings and made him aware of his rights to counsel . He began the intervie~ 
by saying that he had "heard" from the accused's lawyer and advised him to 
call the lawyer. A near 10 minutes trying resulted in only getting an 
answering machine. The officer did supply the accused with a different number 
and contact was made. The accused was given privacy and upon the conclusion 
of the conversation the officer asked: "Did you talk to him?" to which the 
reply was, "Yeah." Then a statement was taken and it was the admiss ibility of 
it that was the issue . 
The discussions and submissions were not in regard to voluntariness, but 
whether the accused had waived his right to counsel when he made the 
statement. The leading case on this is one decided by the Supreme Court of 
Canada in 1986* There, an intoxicated woman explicitly said she did not want 
a lawyer's advice and then gave a statement how she had taken her husband's 
life. The Supreme Court of Canada held that before the Charter, the requisite 
fact to find that she waived her right to counsel was that she declined legal 
advice and gave her statement with "an operating mind". The post Charter 
requirements are application of judicial fairness which includes a finding 
that the person knows what he/she is doing and understands the consequences of 
waiving the right and giving the statement. 
The accused in this case did not have the mental capacity to have such 
understanding (as Mrs. Clarkson didn't due to intoxication). The abstract 
concepts involved were beyond the accused's capability to understand . 
Furthermore, the officer who had done everything he could to ensure the 
accused did speak to his counsel should have inquired, "What did he say? or 
"What did he ask you to do?". He was already aware of the lawyer's wish that 
he wanted to be present during any interview. While inquiring into the 
communications between a lawyer and his client may be sensitive, there was, 
considering the accused's mental handicap, an obligation on the officer "to go 
further in explaining the right if there is something in the circumstances 
which suggests that the accused does not understand." 
* CLARKSON v. The Queen, Volume 24, page 38 of this publication . 
- 24 -
The accused had not waived his right to counsel when he made the statement , as 
such an act requires a clear and unequivocal understanding of the right itself 
and the effect of the waiver. 
Though the officer had acted in good faith in that he believed he had 
complied with all his legal obligations, in fact he hadn't. Further inquiries 
as to the question of waiver were mandatory in the circumstances . Hence, 
there was an infringement of the accused's right to counsel and the 
administration of justice would be brought into disrepute if the statement was 
admitted in evidence. 
* * * * * * 
: 
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IS A SUBJECTIVELY DEGRADING AND UNNECESSARY STRIP SEARCH 
UNREASONABLE? 
Regina v. KALIN - County Court of Vancouver - No. C.C ~ 870602 
September 28, 1987 
When the accused was booked for impaired driving he was frisked and subjected 
to normal body search. He was then taken to a separate cell, asked to drop 
his pants, bend over and spread his buttocks.* An officer shone a light on 
his anus. He was not touched or ridiculed. However, the accused found the 
search degrading, embarrassing and unnecessary . 
When he came to trial the accused moved under s. 24(1) of the Charter that as 
a remedy for the infringement of his right to be secure against unreasonable 
search a judicial stay of proceedings be entered. 
The Crown did not call any of the officers involved with the accused to 
determine their state of mind at the time or their possible reasons for that 
search. There was only evidence of total cooperation by the accused and 
"friendly chatter" between him and the arresting officers. On the other hand, 
the accused had served two years for robbery· and was likely still on 
probation at the time of this arrest. The Crown suggested that this may have 
prompted the gaoler to search the accused because he was a man convicted of a 
crime of violence and not a mere routine search in compliance with policy . 
In reviewing the law on this issue the Court was aware that the Ontario Court 
of Appeal is of the view that a strip search in · these circumstances is 
legal.** In other words, the search itself won't render it unreasonable but 
the manner in which it is carried out may do so. However, that view was not 
binding on this County Court and the judge did not find the judgment of the 
Ontario Court of Appeal persuasive. He held that unless the Crown can show a 
justifiable reason for the strip search (routine or policy are of no 
assistance in this) it was an infringement of the accused's right to be secure 
against unreasonable search. 
That left the question whether the remedy the accused suggested was proper. 
The offence of impaired driving is serious and the accused has a long-standing 
history of convictions for drinking and driving offences. 
* 
** 
At that time it was department policy to search the anus of all male 
prisoners. This policy was dropped shortly after. 
Regina v. Horrison - Ontario Court of Appeal September 1986. 
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The search was by a male officer and was made as minimal as possible in terms 
of being degrading. Therefore, the unreasonable search did not call for "the 
application of the strongest of remedies". 
Application refused . 
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UNION CERTIFICATION - THR.EATS AND 'WEAPONS 
Regina v. Ha/LETJ' - B.C. Court of Appeal - Vancouver 
CA 007446 - December 1987 
The employees of a nightclub applied for union certification. Consequently, a 
soured relationship existed between the employer and the employees. Thefts of 
money became apparent and the employer became the recipient of threatening 
phone calls. 
To put an end to all of this the employer sealed the place off at the end of 
one working day and addressed his employees armed with a loaded shotgun and 
warned in the prelude to what he had to say, "Anybody who tries to leave won't 
make it to the door . " 
With this he fired the gun into an old door he had put across the doorway. 
Although he never pointed the gun at anyone , there were employees in the 
vicinity of the target. Consequently, a charge of possession of a weapon 
dangerous to the public peace w-as laid. The Crown appealed the accused's 
acquittal. 
The trial judge had found that the gun had only been used by the accused to 
intimidate the employees to listen to him. The old door was deliberately 
placed across the doorway to receive the shot that conveyed, 'I mean 
business'. This .was not dangerous to the public peace said the trial judge . 
(He added he would have convicted had the charge been "intimidation".) 
The B.C. Court of Appeal disagreed with the trial judge and held that 
"dangerous to the public peace" encompasses a lot more than placing people in 
physical danger. 
The accused had also been acquitted of the face-to-face threat he made to his 
employees in case they wanted to leave the meeting place. The trial judge had 
found that there was a threat but not one to cause bodily harm or death. 
There must be an intent to make the prohibited threat whether you want to 
carry it out or not. "On the evidence, it was possible to have a reasonable 
doubt that the respondent intended to threaten to cause bodily harm or death." 
Comment: 
Crown's Appeal allowed in regard to possession 
of the weapon 
Crown's Appeal re threatening was dismissed. 
Firstly, it seems fair to say that in B.C. at least face-to-face threats are 
included ins. 243.4(1) C.C. although it seems there is sufficient room in the 
wording to say that the cases under the old section apply. The reasoning by 
the Supreme Court of Canada under the old section suggesting absurdities if 
"face to face" threats are included, still seems persuasive. 
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It i s quite difficult to understand the findings by the two courts that there 
was a reasonable doubt as to the intent of the threat (nothing to do with the 
intent to carry out). A group of people were in essence unlawfully confined 
by a person who held them literally at gunpoint and strongly implied that if 
anyone would leave he/she would not make it to the door. Then this is 
followed up by an exclamatory gunshot into something that represents the exit 
from the meeting place which would at least imply to anyone that should he/she 
want to exercise his/her right to leave, their demise would be similar to that 
of the shattered door. 
It seems to be our national past-time to make labour issues ugly and venomous. 
Our behaviour at labour scenes sometimes is a facsimile of civil war. The 
evidence shows that the accused in this case may have endured the brunt of 
such behaviour . Whether he had invited such treatment or that his act was a 
desperate response to stop intolerable intimidation seems irrelevant to the 
considerations in regard to a criminal verdict. Any sympathy should be 
reflected in the sentencing. 
* * * * * * 
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ARREST AND SEARCH 
Regina v. BECK - County Court of Cariboo - For t St. John 3738 
September 1987 
A Cons table D had encountered the accused over a period of three years in 
relation to transporting and trafficking narcotics. The method of operation 
was well known and the numerous times the constable received information from 
informers was found to be reliable. Searches of the accused's home and 
vehicle had nearly always pajd off and had resulted in the seizure of 
narcotics. Information and corroborative evidence gave the officer grounds 
for believing that the accused was supplying an Indian Reservation with 
narcotics and transported the contraband in the very early morning hours when 
he thought there "were no police officers on duty". 
Constable D on his way to an unrelated call, went with his partner down the 
highway at 0500 hours. He spotted the accused driving his truck. The accused 
was stopped, arrested for possession of narcotics and then the truck was 
searched. A considerable quantity of narcotics were found in the spare tire 
upon a "cursory" search. The tire was apparently in the open box with the 
lead not being sealed to t he rim and it immediately became suspect to be the 
package. 
Needless to say, the defence argued that the search was conducted upon an 
arbitrary arrest. Therefore, the search was unreasonable and the evidence 
found ought to be excluded. 
The Court found that the prerequisite grounds for the arrest and the search 
are the same. Either can only be legally effected upon reasonable grounds for 
believing that the accused possessed narcotics. 
Consequently, the Court reasoned: 
"If the search was reasonable, the detention of 
the accused was also reasonable to carry it out. 
Whether that detention was by way of formal 
arrest or otherwise is not important." 
Considering the knowledge Constable D had of the accused's method 
he had the reasonable grounds to do what he did, and therefore, 
infringement of the accused's right to not be arbitrarily 
detained and to not be subjected to an unreasonable search. 
of operation 
there was no 
arrested or 
In the event he was mistaken, the County Court Judge indicated that he would 
still admit the evidence as the reputation of the administration of justice 
would not be affected by it. The officer had acted in good faith; his conduct 
was not capricious considering his knowledge of the accused; his actions could 
not b e considered harassment; the offence is one of considerable gravity, 
etc . 
Defence Motion to suppress the evidence was denied. 
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Comment: 
There are some points in these reasons for judgement that may receive 
different considerations from other judges. If there was any merit to the 
defence's submissions it was in regard to the claimed arbitrary arrest of the 
accused. This Court reco.gnized that 1but then concluded that it really made no 
difference. The Court implied that the accused was detained in any event, 
whether the constable effected the arrest or not. However, there are some 
possible counter arguments to that conclusion. 
Arrest is by the "Judges' Golden Rules" a gateway to a lawful search for 
evidence. Detention can come as a result of a search and can exis t without an 
arrest having been effected. In other words, the cause and effects are 
reversed and detention is included in arrest but not the other way around . 
Detention can consequently be quite distinct from arrest but both trigger the 
same Charter · rights . Another trial judge may find that if the search caused 
the detention it does not assist in rendering the search lawful. If the 
arrest was lawful so wa s the search (at common law). Thus to say that how 
detention was attained i s of no consequence, may be arguable. 
Also, to find that the grounds for a lawful arrest under s. 450 C. C. and 
grounds to conduct a lawful search under s. 10.1 of the Narcotic Control Act 
are the same could cause a debate. The arrest could only be effected on 
belief based on reasonable and probable grounds while the search could be 
conducted on belief on reasonable grounds only. In the case of an arrest , the 
grounds for believing that a person has committed an offence must not only be 
reasonable but must also make it probable that that is so. The grounds for 
the search are less stringent than the grounds for an arrest. One may 
conclude that the beliefs of the officer in this case were no doubt 
reasonable, but that the accused was in possession of narcotics was in the 
realm of possibility rather than probability. Consequently, stopping the 
accused was not arbitrary and the search was lawful. However, to effect an 
arrest on those beliefs may wel l be short of the prerequisites the law 
stipulates. 
If this is correct the officer had the powe r to search (provided, of course, 
the Court finds that where the accused was found is a "place")* but not to 
arrest, and if the arrest is unlawful it is capable of becoming the poisonous 
tree on which no good fruit can grow. 
Another member of the judiciary could have reasoned that the officer should 
have simply searched the truck based on the reasonable grounds he had to do 
so. This would have caused the accused to be detained during the search and 
would have entitled him to the same rights as when he would have been 
arrested. 
However, that judge could likely have reasoned similarly to the trial judge in 
this case, that admission of the evidence would, in these circumstances, not 
bring the administration of justice into disrepute. 
* See Regina v. SKINNER on page 33 of this Volume . 
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R.EASONABLE SEARCH - ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE 
Regina v. KOKESCH - County Court of Vancouver Island -
Nanaimo CR 3585 - November 1987 
Acting upon information from police in another community, police officers 
followed a certain vehicle to an address. 
The house and vehicle were kept under surveillance for four days. Then the 
officers attended at the address at 0200 hours and went up the 100 yard 
driveway to the house and searched around the house. They noticed 
condensation on the sealed off basement windows. From a louvered vent a smell 
of marihuana emitted, as well as heat excessive for normal heating. There was 
also a hwnrning sound coming from that basement. The officers had come right 
up to the house and had attempted to look in. 
When asked if he was of the opinion to have bad reasonable grounds to search 
at that time, the officer conceded he only had a suspicion that an offence was 
being committed in the house. 
The officers obtained a search warrant for the dwelling. With this warrant 
they also s~arched the vehicle they had followed. The warrant had been issued 
on the basis of what was discovered during the early morning stroll for 
discovery at and near the dwelling house in question. The County Court Judge 
ruled that the yard surrounding the dwelling house is a place that may be 
searched without a warrant provided the police have reasonable grounds for 
believing that narcotics are illegally held or kept there. The officers had 
no such grounds nor had they attempted any alternative investigative means of 
discovering them. Therefore, the search was unlawful and this rendered the 
subsequent search warrant invalid. Hence, the search of the house during 
which the evidence for possession for the purpose of trafficking and 
cultivating rnarihuana was obtained was warrantless. 
The next question was whether the search was unreasonable. In view of the 
fishing expedition, based on unsubstantiated information, the search was 
unreasonable. The next question then was whether the administration of 
justice could be brought into disrepute if the evidence resulting from the 
unreasonable search would be admitted. Mainly, in view of the officers 
availing themselves of the illegal investigation methods without trying 
alternative ways of securing the requisite grounds to do what they did, the 




SEARCH OF PER.SON AND CAR FOR NARCOTICS 
Regina v. SKINNER - County Court of Vancouver - No. C.C. 871252 
December 1987 
The accused was found driving the wrong way on a one-way street. His ability 
to drive appeared impaired. He admitted to have smoked marihuana which was 
corroborated by a strong smell of that narcotic corning from his breath. The 
officers searched the accused and his car and found the evidence which was the 
basis for the allegation that the accused was in possession of a narcotic. 
The trial judge had not admitted the evidence and the Crown appealed this 
decision. 
The County Court Judge held that the officers had, considering the 
circumstances, reasonable grounds for believing that the accused possessed a 
narcotic. However, such grounds only give the right for a peace officer to 
search a "place" and any person found in such a "place". The trial Judge had 
held that the accused had been found on the street and that is not included in 
the meaning of "place". This being so, there was no authority to search the 
accused despite the grounds for believing he possessed a narcotic, unless he 
had been placed under arrest. 
The Court rejected this defence position and applied the findings of the 
Ontario Court of Appeal on this issue in 1984*. 
"The word 'place' when found in a statute is 
usually associated with other words, which 
control its meaning. The word 'place', however, 
may include an automobile. It does not, 
however, include public streets, or other 
places." 
"The word 'place' includes places of fixed 
location such as offices or shops or gardens as 
well as vehicles, vessels and aircraft." 
In 1986 the Ontario Court of Appeal** reiterated its ruling 
held that an automobile is included in the word "place". 
rulings were not binding on this B. C. County Court, they 
persuasive by this B.C. Judge and others . 
on this point and 
Al though these 
were found to be 
* R. v. RAD - 40 C.R. (3d). 
** R. v. DEBar - 30 C.C.C. (3d) 207. 
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The argument that the accused was searched on the street outside the car was 
also defeated as he had been " found" in the car. 
The search had been lawful and reasonable and the evidence should have been 
admitted. 
Crown's appeal allowed 
New trial ordered. 
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RIGIIT TO COUNSEL - BURDEN TO PROVE INFRINGEMENT ON ACCUSED 
Regina v. LEITCH - County Court of Vancouver -
No. C.C. 861864 - April 1987 
The accused collided with a police car. His condition was such that blood 
samples were demanded of him. He phoned a lawyer and spoke to her for 
fourteen minutes. When asked: "Did you get hold of your lawyer?" He 
replied, "Yes, but she told me I should contact another lawyer ... ". This 
lawyer lived in the Yukon and the accused was allowed to place the long 
distance call (from Vancouver). Some 25 minutes later, after police making 
every effort to contact this lawyer for the accused, it was found that his 
number was no longer in service. 
This created an impasse. The officers demanded the accused to take the test 
while the accused refused to do so without his lawyer. After it was 
explained that he was obligated to blow, the accused gave the required 
samples. The first sample was given 1 hour and 16 minutes from the time of 
the accident. Thirty-nine minutes of that time was spent by the accused in 
speaking to his lawyer and trying to get hold of the one he was referred to. 
The trial judge found that the police officers had accommodated the accused 
to "a great extent" and that his Charter right to counsel had not been 






argued that the right to counsel includes receiving competent 
He used the police's extensive efforts to try to contact the 
as evidence of their knowledge that the advice the accused 
his own lawyer had not been adequate and competent. 
The County Court Judge found that the 14 minute conversation the accused had 
with a qualified lawyer is adequate time to gain advice. All he said to 
police after that call was that he was to contact another lawyer some distance 
away. He did not say why, neither was there any evidence that this was for 
him to gain expert or more competent advice. The Court was left to guess that 
and defence counsel invited the Court to draw that inference. 
The County Court Judge reminded defence counsel that the burden of proving (on 
a balance of probabilities ) that the rights of the accused were infringed are 




RF.ASONABLE BODY SEARCH 
Regina v. WIEDEHAYER - The County Court of Yale - Kelowna 87/16 
October 1987 
A police constable, who was considered to be a forthright and truthful witness 
had been told by an informer that the accused had a narcotic on him. The 
officer confro-:-ited the eccu!:ed en the street and said, "David, you are going 
to be searched for narcotics." "Go ahead.", said the accused while he spread 
his arm. Marihuana was found on him and he was consequently charged with 
possession. 
When the exhibits and the certificate of analysis were presented the accused 
objected to their admission into evidence. He claimed that the search was 
unreasonable and therefore had infringed his right under s . 8 of the Charter. 
The Court held that the officer had real evidence that the accused was in 
possession of a narcotic. He had to act when he did or else the evidence 
would likely not have been found. The Judge was of the opinion that the 
search was reasonable and said that should he be wrong he would still admit 
the evidence as in the circumstances it could not bring the administration of 
justice into disrepute. 
The evidence found existed prior to the detention, and search. The evidence 
had not been obtained by means of some self-incriminating situation which 
would deprive the accused of a fair trial. In addition, the officer had acted 
in good faith. 
Evidence was admitted . 
Note: 
The Judge held that the accused was detained from the time the officer told 
him he would be searched. He was not told of his right to counsel until he 
was arrested subsequent to the search. No issue was made of this delay in 
making the accused aware of his rights. It would seem that the B.C. Court of 
Appeal on November 18, 1987 has opened the door to this Charter argument. A 
suspected impaired driver subjected to a sobriety test is considered detained 
and must be made aware of his rights to counsel prior to the test. That B.C. 
Court of Appeal decision may in principle not to be distinct from this case. 
However, this decision was handed down two months prior to the B.C. Court of 
appeal judgment.* 
* R. v. BONOGOFSKI - See Volume 29, page 1 of this publication. 
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THEFT I. FALSE PRETENCES OR FRAUD 
Regina v. CORHAK - County Court of Vancouver Island -
Victoria 44963 - September 1987 
The accused took a cassette tape player out of a display case in a department 
store, put it in a bag with the store's name on it, went to the cashier and 
claimed he purchased the item the day before and now wanted his money 
refunded. He was given the money and was arresteq as he left the store . A 
charge of theft of the cassette player was preferred and the accused was 
convicted. He appealed. 
False pretences and fraud are distinct from theft in that in the latter the 
owner does not wish to part with the property (other than by the offer of a 
contract). In false pretences and fraud the owner knowingly parts with the 
property. The means by which the owner was persuaded to give up the ownership 
constitutes the crime. The accused argued that his intent was not to steal 
the i;-ecorder, neither had he moved it from the display case for the purpose 
of depriving the owner of the recorder. His sole intent was to defraud the 
store of funds equal to the amount mentioned on the price - tag. Consequently, 
he may have committed a crime but not that of theft. 
The County Court Judge held that the accused obtained the "refund" money by a 
false pretence or fraud. However, there was also a theft although a short 
lived one. The recorder was moved by the accused for the purpose of 
converting it to his own use. In other words, he stole the recorder to use it 
in the separate and distinct crime of false pretences. 
Note: 
Appeal dismissed 
Conviction of theft upheld 
It seems much safer to charge false pretences in circumstances like these. It 
is also likely that the judiciary will not recognize this as a precedent where 
someone switches price tags and then presents an item to the cashier to have 
the benefit of a lower price. There are cases where an allegation of theft 
has been soundly rejected in such circumstances. False pretences was held to 
be the appropriate charge. The distinctions are self-explanatory. 
.· 
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UNNECESSARY ARREST - ADMISSIBILITY OF CERTIFICATE OF ANALYSES 
Regina v. 11EYERS - B.C. Court of Appeal - Vancouver CA 008399 
February 1988 
A constable stopped the accused, arrested him for impaired driving and 
subsequently (prior to taking breath samples) issued him a 24 hour suspension 
notice. As a result of the analyses of two breath samples given upon demand, 
17 minutes apart, a certificate was adduced in court showing a blood .alcohol 
content well in excess of the legal limit. He was convicted of "over 80 mg . " 
and applied for leave to appeal his conviction to the B.C. Court of Appeal on 
two grounds . 
1. The arrest was unlawful as it was contrary to s . 450 
(2) C.C. and thereby did infringe the accused' s right 
under the Charter (s.7); and 
2. The Certificate of Analysis was inadmissible as the 
Crown failed to prove the samples were taken at least 
15 minutes from one another. 
The Arrest : 
The officer testified that he had effected the arrest to prevent continuation 
or repetition of the offence of impaired driving and to secure the necessary 
evidence for the indictable offence he had reasonable and probable grounds to 
believe the accused had committed. Defence counsel argued that the officer 
could have accomplished his objectives without the arrest. A demand for 
samples of breath would have been sufficient. 
The B. C. Court of Appeal gave a very short reply to this argument. It 
reiterated its 1984 decision* on this point , that since the officer relied 
upon the statute which authorized him to effect the arrest, "the detention by 
any definition that could possibly be applied, was not arbitrary". 
Admissibility of the Certificate : 
Defence counsel had asked the accused and a defence expert in examination in 
chief and the constable in cross-examination, if it takes time to take a 
breath sample ("Is there a period of time between commencement of the taking 
of a sample and the conclusion of taking a sample"). 
By this he proved that any human activity takes time. He was very careful not 
to ask any of these witnesses how long the taking of a breath sample takes. 
* See R. v. Hclntosh - B.C.A.A. 002074 Vancouver 1984. Also, Volume 
18, page 19 and Volume 29, page 21 of this publication. 
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The B.C . Court of Appeal, also for this argument, reiterated another decision 
they made in 1984*. It said again that the statement in a certificate that a 
sample was taken at a certain time and another was taken 15 minutes or more 
later, is conclusive and final. Said the Court of Appeal: 
* 
"The Criminal . Code does not require that the 
certificate of analysis should clearly state the 
time in which the taking of the first sample was 
completed and the time at which the taking of 
the second sample was commenced" . 
Leave to appeal denied 
Conviction to stand . 
R. v . lf()()RE - B. C.A.A. 001604 (1984). 
this publication. "How to prove there 
taking of samples of breath." 
See Volume 18, page 32 of 
is 15 minutes between the 
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CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE - VICIOUS DOG 
Regina v. HOUGH - County Court of Vancouver - C.C . 850039 
The accused's "Mugsy'', a pitbull terrier, was kept in an inadequate kennel at 
the rear of the accused's home. The accused knew the kennel could not detain 
Mugsy and he also knew from neighbours, friends and others that his dog had 
bitten adults and children alike on several occasions. Putting his teeth into 
human flesh seemed a pnstime for Mugsy. When a neighbour discussed the dog 
with the accused he s:..;.gt;c.s.:"d that Mugsy would not bite children. The 
accused had replied, "No, he will bite." After the accused owned the dog for 
several months and was Lilly aware of the vicious propensities of his Mugsy, 
the dog was at large age in on two successive days. On the first day, he 
indulged himself on a lady and the second day on a doctor. The indiscriminate 
activities on the part of l'-'.ut_;sy on these two occasions resulted in allegations 
of criminal negligence causing bodily harm. 
The court firstly rejected the accused's submission that the charges were 
preferred on account of th;. recent negative publicity the breed (pitbull 
terrier) received. The evidence of the dog's behaviour, regardless of breed, 
and the owner's knowledge and disregard for the safety of others will have to 
support the allegations. 
The accused was fully aware of Mugsy' s propensities and the fact that the 
kennel had no preventative value in keeping Mugsy from getting out and 
actively pursuing his hobby. HE knew people were continuously victimized by 
Mugsy and the accused, despite his awareness, did nothing to prevent 




In Volume 13 (page 24) there is a far more elaborate synopsis of the law 
surrounding domesticated animals and the criminal as well as civil liability 
of their keepers. It deals with the well known B.C. case of the Rotweilers 
that chewed up two children (R. v . Manfred and Vera Hayerhofer). 
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STATEMENT - VOUJNTARINESS - CREDIBILITY 
Regina v. THORNI1T and PIERRE - County Court o f Vancouver -
No . 870956 - November 1987 
The wife of an accused person pleaded with the co-accused to confess. This 
would result in her husband going free she said. The co-accused did confess. 
It was clear that police had not instructed the wife to approach the co-
accused , but they had provided her with the opportunity and "her words were 
capable of arousing in him the hope that the police would make good their 
promise if he confessed". The confession was ruled inadmissible.* 
In this case, the two accused (young adults) were seemingly caught in the act 
of attempting to break and enter premises. House breaking tools were seized 
and the accused were apprehended . A detective interviewed the accused 
Thornitt. He told him he had a " feeling" that he had been involved in other 
Band E's. Thornitt rejected that idea. 
The same detective then interviewed the accused Pierre and told h im that a 
charge of possession of house breaking tools would be preferred and invited 
him to clear up any other B and E's he had been involved in. Pierre phoned 
his brother- in- law (a policeman) and then said he wanted to make a clean 
breast of things. He confessed to seven additional break - ins he and Thornitt 
had been involved in . Before making the confession, Pierre had unsuccessfully 
requested that Thornitt could be present while he made his statement. A short 
time later, a period during which the two accused were in the vicinity of one 
another with nothing to prevent them from conversing, Thornitt also confessed . 
Both accused testified during the voire dire and their version of how the 
confessions were made differed from that of the detective. They claimed that 
the typical inducements were made: "If you don't cooperate it won't look 
good for you in Court." "The judge would look down on us for being 
resistant." "It would be better for us to clear things up . " etc . 
In terms of credibility, there was no contest. The accused's testimony had an 
air of unreality and could not be accepted. This , along with Pierre ' s 
testimony that he felt he had let his family down and wanted to redeem himself 
beginning by coming clean, made it quite clear that it was his remorse that 
made him confess rather than any inducement by the detective. The detective 
saying: "I think all B & E charges may perhaps be dealt with at the same 
time.", was not an inducement or promise but a neutral statement that does not 
misrepresent the criminal process. 
However, was that also the case with Thornitt? There were no improprieties on 
the part of police directly, but there had been no desire to confess on his 
part. As a matter of fact, when he heard that Pierre had told all (including 
the other B & E's they had been involved in together) he had been angry. His 
* The Queen v. BALI.ANGER is a British case . No references were given 
in the judgement . 
- 41 -
lawyer claimed that there was no distinction between what happened in this 
case and the circumstances in the case of the wife who pleaded with her 
husband's co-accused to confess. In other words, what Pierre had said to 
Thornitt subsequent to making his confession, could by Thornitt, be assumed 
to have come from the police. The court drew the inference from Pierre's 
evidence that he had also attempted to persuade Thornitt to confess. The 
test, whether or not there was an inducement, is a subjective one. It does 
not matter whether it was the police who directly or indirectly held out the 
inducement. Voluntariness is a prerequisite to admissibility so we can rely 
on the truth of the content of the statement and an inducement may make the 
statement unreliable. Therefore, it is what the person, who makes the 
statement, believes, that is important. 
The detective had referred to the process he followed as a new investigation 
technique. From this the court inferred that the method used was designed to 
have an accused persuade a co-accused to confess. "I think that was what had 
been the hope of ... " the detective. 
The court concluded that there were no inducements, threats or promises . 
Thornitt no doubt confessed because of what passed between him and Pierre but 
that Hdoesn't affect the issue one way or the other" said the court. Without 
elaborating any further, the judge held that the circumstances in this case 
were not analogous to that in the case of the accused ' s wife pleading with his 
co-accused. 
Statements admitted in evidence . 
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REASONABLF..NESS OF SF.ARCH 
Regina v. CH~ANIEC - County Court of Westminster X018247 
October 1987 
A constable spotted the accused standing next to a pick-up truck in the middle 
of the night. Although the truck was owned by the accused and parked in front 
of his home, the constable remained suspicious due to the accused's 
nervousness and the fact that he claimed to be checking a tire for a slow 
leak at 2: 30 a. m. This suspicion grew when the officer learned from the 
office while staking out the truck, that the accused had a lengthy criminal 
record including convictions related to narcotics. Shortly after, the 
accused came out of the house again, headed for the truck while looking in 
both directions . \..Th.en he obviously spotted the police car be withdrew back 
into the house. This confirmed it for the constable that there was contraband 
in the truck the accused was attempting to unload. Having been discovered 
anyway the constable used his flashlight to see if there was anything visible 
in the truck. Again, the accused came outside and he expressed annoyance with 
the officer's preoccupation with his truck. The accused asked if there had 
been any B and E's in the neighbourhood. The officer answered in the 
affirmative and said in the same breath: "What are you hiding in the truck?" 
He received no answer. 
The information the officer by now had, coupled with the fact that he had 
deal.t with the cultivation of marihuana at the house from which the accused 
kept appearing, caused him to propose that the accused allow him to search 
the truck. The response was a definite "No." 
This prompted the constable to promise that he would stay around night and day 
until the accused would move the truck. Instead, the officer returned to his 
office and sought advice from more experienced colleagues. He was told, "If 
you believe there are. drugs in the truck you have grounds to search." The 
Court held that at this point the officer had solid grounds to be suspicious, 
but did not have the reasonable grounds to search. 
Here, the reasons for judgment make a quantum jump and deal with the 
admissibility of the fruits of a search of the truck which resulted in the 
accused being charged with possession of a narcotic for the purpose of 
trafficking. 
The Court was very complimentary to the constable 
commendable deliberations to comply with complex law. 
deliberate, flagrant or wilful. 
in respect to his 
His conduct was not 
This caused the Judge to hold that, despite the fact that the search was 
warrantless and unreasonable, disallowing the evidence would not find approval 
in the eyes of the community or any reasonable man. 
The narcotics were admitted in evidence. 
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VALIDITY OF SF.ARCH YARRANTS - UNREASONABLE SEARCH 
Regina v. WATI and HICKS - County Court of Vancouver -
No . C.C. 870523 - November 1987 
A "Crime Stoppers" tip reported that marihuana was being harvested "today" at 
a certain address. Immediate surveillance of the house resulted in a van 
being searched that left the premises with two male occupants. Upon 
instructions to stop the vehicle under any pretext and search it resulted in 
seizing one pound of freshly cut marihuana. In the meantime, a search warrant 
was applied for based on the "tip" and what was found in the van. One J . p . 
refused to issue the warrant. · After learning that one occupant of the van 
had said the marihuana "came from" the address (the other had said it came 
from elsewhere) the same information was taken to another J . P. who did issue 
the warrant. However , it had been added that "another informant" said that he 
knows cannabis is grown in the basement of the address. 
Apparently the premises were searched and contraband was found as the entire 
judgment is dealing with the admissibility of that evidence . 
The application for the warrant did fail to disclose that the "other" person 
in the van had said that the marihuana came from another address . The 
investigator had not included this in the information as he had disbelieved 
that statement. The Court held that his beliefs were substituting those of 
the J.P. It is the J . P . who, based on all of the evidence, must believe that 
the applicant has the prerequisite grounds for a search . 
The application also had left the erroneous impression of continuity in 
relation to the address, the van and the pound of marihuana. In fact, the van 
was only followed a short distance from leaving the address. "Other officers 
searched the van a considerable distance away" under the apparent pretext that 
they were searching it as a van of similar description was involved in a 
robbery the previous evening. There was no evidence to show there was such a 
robbery . 
The second J.P. had been present during a radio conversation the investigator 
had with the officers who stopped and searched the van and he therefore was 
aware of all the information. That, the Court held, is not good enough as the 
J.P. cannot go beyond the sworn evidence. 
Due to a lack of "proper" evidence before t he J.P. upon which he could 
exercise his discretion the warrant was declared invalid and the search was 
consequently warrantless. As the Crown declined to show that the search was 




We are only in the early stages of this sort of scrutiny of applications for 
judicial licences. As a consequence, a number of issues are far from 
settled. This Judge has dealt with some of those issues as though they were 
well established in law in that he gave no reason why they were like that . 
One of these is what a J.P. is told by the applicant is part of the 
information some courts have held. In this case, .the sworn evidence contained 
in the information was held to be the sole source upon which the J.P. can 
exercise his judicial discreti.on. The court, in essence, quashed ~he warrant 
by declaring it invalid. There is considerable law to indicate that a trial 
judge cannot quash a warrant but can only declare a search unreasonable if he 
finds flaws and faults in the way it was obtained. 
No doubt, some liberties were taken in this case and the application could 
have been improved upon. The judge did not wish to say that the investigator 
had been deceptive but held that the possibility of it was sufficient to rule 
as he did. With that, it seems implied that if the misleading of the J.P. is 
unintentional the search may still be reasonable. Also, that is not 
completely in line with the precedents on these issues. 
* * * * * * 
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REFUSING TO GIVE BLOOD SAMPLE 
'WHAT NEEDS TO BE PROVED? 
Regina v. HARTIN - County Court of Vancouver -
No. C. C. 870101 - October 1987 
As it was obvious that it would be impracticle to take breath samples from 
the accused a demand was made of him (in hospital) to give f: sample of his 
blood. He bluntly refused but later told a nurse she could take a sample 
provided she would not give any of it to the police. He wa& consequently 
convicted of refusing and he appealed the conviction. 
The accused argued that it was simply not sufficient for the Crr·wn to prove 
grounds for the demand, the demand itself and the refusal t o obtain a 
conviction. In addition, it should also have to prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt that requisite conditions for the taking of a blood sample as outlined 
ins. 238(3) C.C . existed (impracticability of taking breath samples, physical 
condition which incapacitates the person from giving breath samples and that 
the taking of a sample would not endanger life or health of the persor:). 
The Crown submitted that the accused refused - period. What did it ma~ter if 
conditions for taking the b lood sample were in place? 
The Court held that s . 238(3)(C) C.C. outlines the prerequisites tu the 
demand and refusa.l. It would be absurd to call doctors and nurses to say that 
if the accused had not refused, a sample could have been taken. A refusal 
based on one of the conditions that must be in place to take the sample is not 
a refusal as referred to in the C.C . For instance, if a policeman, after a 
demand, would attempt to take blood with a syringe at the scene of .>n 
accident, and the suspect would not allow it, that would not be a refusal . 




THEIT BY FINDING OR BY CONVERSION 
Regina v. HUNTINGFORD - County Court of Vancouver - No. C.C . 861811 -
February 1988 
The accused and fellow workers attended at the home of a colleague for an 
after-work bash. One of the libatants broke his leg in the driveway when he 
went searching for his car to go home. Needless to say, everyone went outside 
to comfort and render aid to the unfortunate fellow until the ambulance took 
him away. Picking up pillows, coats and such after the excitement was all 
over , the accused claimed he found two rings in the driveway. He kept them 
and promptly sold them for $50 each the next morning . He said to police he 
had considered the rings "scrap" and had not asked who owned them as he 
anticipated false claims of ownership. Of course, him selling the rings 
defeats the claim of them being no more than scrap without value. 
Consequently' the accused was charged with breaking I entry and theft' and 
possession of stolen property . The first charge was based on a Crown theory 
that the rings were not found but taken from the home the following day when 
he was dropped off to pick up his car while everyone had gone elsewhere to 
continue the 'celebration ' . 
Three interesting legal questions arose : 
1. Must the intent to steal be present when the conversion takes place 
or can it arise subsequently, completing the offence at that time? 
2. Can a thief be guilty of possessing the goods he stole. I s, in 
those circumstances, possession not an act of necessity to theft and 
therefore an included offence. 
The Court held· that if someone finds something it does not amount to theft 
until that person forms the intention to convert what is found to his own 
use. 
In this case, no charge of theft was preferred and the accused could not be 
convicted of theft as an included offence to breaking, entry and theft. There 
was simply no evidence to support the Crown's theory and all charges were 
dismissed. 
Comment: 
If the Crown had prosecuted along the lines of the accused's version of how 
he obtained the rings (by adducing his statement as proof of the truth of its 
content) a conviction on the conunon law theory of theft by finding seemed to 
have been probable. 
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SIMILJ\R FACT EVIDENCE 
Regina v. SCHWAB - Supreme Court of B.C. 
Vernon 17239 - November 1987 
In 1981 the accused took a 16 year old girl for a sight-seeing ride . He took 
her to a remote spot, overpowered the girl and smashed her in the eye. He 
wore a knife in a sheath which was threatening to the girl . In compliance 
with his dictates she alioweri him ~o have intercourse with her. When he drove 
her home he offered to give her a $500 car he just purchased. He spent four 
years in jail for that crime. 
In June of 1987, the accused offered an 18 year old girl a ride home. He 
drove her to a secluded spot, put a knife to her throat, forced her head onto 
his penis and demanded intercourse. He also drove her home and offered her 
$20 and 100 hits of acid. 
During his trial for the latter alleged sexual assault the Crown called the 
1981 victim to relate what had happened to her as similar fact evidence. 
Needless to say, similar fact evidence cannot be adduced for the purpose of 
demonstrating that the accused has committed a similar crime before and 
therefore he had likely done it again. It can only be tendered to show 
similarities in the modus operandi, or peculiarities the acts of the past and 
those alleged have in common. A prejudicial effect of tendering such evidence 
is inevitable; however, it must be relevant and its probative value must 
outweigh the consequential prejudice . Modes will assis t to prove 
identification and rebut any suggestion of innocent association . The modes 
in the two cases above are indeed similar as was the wording of the threats 
and the apparent need to compensate for what was done. Yet, they are not 
unheard of if one considers other cases. 
The similarities between the two incidents were too general and failed to 
include in each a peculiarity that makes it safe to conclude that both acts 
were performed by the same person. Consequently, the jury did not get to hear 
the evidence of the 1981 incident. 
****** 
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SEARCH YARRANJS - REASONABLE SEARCH 
Regina v. COCORAN and BATE - County Court of Vancouver 
Powell River 05553 F - October 1987 
Police had reasonable and probable grounds to believe the two accused (who 
apparently lived common law) cultivated and possessed marihuana for the 
purpose of trafficking. As the couple was in the process of moving, search 
warrants were issued for both premises. Nothing was found in either house. 
However, police spotted a separate building on the property and an additional 
search warrant was taken out. This search warrant was identically worded to 
the one issued on the new premises. The grounds . remained the same. However, 
there was an additional building that, in their opinion, should be checked, 
based on their "observations". Because the information for the third warrant 
was copied from the first two, the building i s attested to be the dwelling of 
the accused. This, of course, was not a full disclosure and was inaccurate. 
Considering what the officers knew and the actual grounds for the third 
warrant, the information on which it was issued was inconsistent with 
reality. The officers had made an erroneous shortcut "which was patently 
wrong" despite their lack of malicious intent. 
Although the judgment did not clarify this point, one can infer that the 
charges against the accused were based on what was found by means of the 
third warrant. Thus, the Judge had to consider the admissibility of the 
evidence. 
The accused were not "known traffickers". However, the community's confidence 
in the justice system could be shaken if evidence was admitted which had been 





MISREPRESENTATION TO GAIN ACCESS TO A HOKE 
FOR THE PURPOSE OF GATHERING EVIDENCE 
Regina v. HANDSOR - County Court of Westminster -
New Westminster No. X017911 - June 1987 
Recently, the Saskatchewan Court of Queen's Bench excluded the evidence of a 
wildlife officer who had purchased meat from a suspect. The purchase was made 
in the suspect's home to which the officer ~ained access by deception (by not 
identifying himself as a wildlife officer). In this case a police officer, 
who did not identify himself, was invited into the accused's home on two 
occasions for the purpose of purchasing marihuana from him . A search warrant 
was subsequently executed and a modest amount of marihuana was seized. 
Needless to say, the defence used the Saskatchewan case to argue that all 
evidence should be excluded due to the unlawful intrusion upon the rights of 
the accused. 
The County Court Judge had great doubts if any Charter right had been 
infringed by the deception. Even if there was an infringement of a right the 
administration of justice would not be brought into disrepute . 
Evidence admitted . 
* See page 45 of Volume 29 of this publication - Regina v. Bamford . 
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JUSTIFICATION FOR REFUSING A FIREARM ACQUISITION CERTIFICATE 
HICKLE and The Queen - Supreme Court of British Colwnbia 
Vancouver CC 8700972 - November 1987 
Mickle had applied for the acquisition certificate he required to purchase a 
rifle. He was a member of a well known and allegedly disreputable motorcycle 
club, and consequently the certificate was refused. He applied to a 
provincial court judge to have the reasons for refusal reviewed ·and the 
decision by the firearms o:fi~er reversed. 
At the hearing before the provincial court judge a police witness had 
testified that members of the motorcycle club the applicant belonged to "are 
involved in many activities from intimidation, contract murder, drug 
involvement, money laundering, loan sharking, weapons, theft of vehicles, and 
that sort of thing." He had gleaned this knowledge from personally monitoring 
the club members and reading numerous files. The applicant was the president 
of a local chapter of the motorcycle club which expanded "to worldwide 
proportions involved in drug trade ... murder ... intimidation of witnesses". 
The chapter headed up by the applicant consisted of 12 members. Much of the 
police evidence was no doubt hearsay and there was nothing in the police 
files that showed the applicant was personally involved in any of such 
criminal activities. 
At this stage of the proceedings the hearing was adjourned. The applicant's 
counsel, by correspondence, demanded that the police expert produce the 
police files containing the information testified to so he could conduct a 
proper cross-examination. When the hearing resumed a member of the R.C.M.P. 
special squad monitoring the activities of motorcycle club testified that he 
was a person interested within the meaning of s. 36.11 of the Canada Evidence 
Act and objected to disclosing the information the applicant demanded, 
" ... on the grounds of a specified public 
interest being the disclosure of certain 
information contained in R.C.M.P. Special E 
files could reveal information sources, police 
investigation techniques, or the nature of 
ongoing investigations by the unit or other 
police agencies that coordinate their efforts 
with Special E Squad." 
The hearing was again adjourned for the applicant to petition the Supreme 
Court of B. C. to determine if the R. C .M. P. were obliged to disclose the 
information the applicant demanded. (Sees. 36.1(3) Canada Evidence Act). 
The Justice of the Supreme Court firstly described the proceedings before the 
Provincial Court judge in terms of process and purpose. The rules of evidence 
need not be adhered to and hearsay evidence may be admitted as long as the 
judge finds it credible. The purpose is simply to examine if the decision of 
the Firearms Officer not to issue a permit can be confirmed. The burden of 
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proof is on the Crown to show justification for the refusal to issue the 
permit; the degree of proof is on a balance of probabilities . * 
A Staff Sergeant testified that due to the violent tendencies of those in the 
motor cycle gangs information can only be obtained through informers. Even 
disclosing the reasons for his objections to disclosure would do irreparable 
harm to the work of the special squad which monitors the club activities. A 
Chief Superintendent indicated that disclosure would reveal informants and 
undercover agents thereby jeopardizing their lives. It would also disclose 
police tactics and operations. 
The applicant's lawyer argued that here the Crown had called a witness to givte 
the most damaging evidence against his client and the organization he belongs 
to, and then he is blocked from cross-examining that witness due to State 
secrecy rules . Furthermore, the Crown should show that the information the 
applicant sought accP.ss to is jeopardizing the anonymity of informers . 
In respect to the common law regarding informers, the Supreme Court Justice 
was very mindful that it favoured the strictest protection of identity and 
information . . Despite the explicit post Charter decision** by the Supreme 
Court of Canada on the point , the Justice observed how there had been some 
departures from this principle (all in wiretap authorization cases). A 
difference of opinion among the provinces i s obvious, despite the explicit 
ruling by the Supreme Court of Canada: 
"It has been decided once and for all, subject 
to· the law being changed, that information 
regarding police informers' identify will be, 
because of its content, a class of information 
which is in the public interest to keep secret, 
and that this interest will prevail over the 
need to ensure the highest pos s ible standard of 
justice." 
In this case , the matte r was not guilt or innocence but merely if the 
applicant should be extended the privilege of a firearms permit. The need to 
maintain confidentiality outweighed the application of the highest standards 
of justice in processing the application for · a firearms acquisition 
certificate. 
Concluded the B. C. Supreme Court Justice after saying that the applicant 
expected too much of s. 7 of the Charter : 
* 
** 
R. v. DHILLON (1981) 64 C.C.C . (2d) 483 . B.C. Court of Appeal. 
BISAILLON v. KEABLE et al (1983), 7 C.C.C. (3d) 385 - Supreme Court 
of Canada. Also, see Volume 15 of this publication . 
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"There is no absolute right to a firearms 
acquisition certificate and there is no right to 
perfect fairness and disclosure in every 
proceeding. Every privilege, including 
informant and Crown privilege, both of which 
were recognized at common law, make lawful 
inroads upon perfection and if s. 7 applies at 
all, it can tolerate the reasonable limitations 
contained ins. 36.l of the Evidence Act." 
* * * * * * 
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WAS THE ASSAULT A SEXUAL ASSAULT 
Regina v . EDWARDS - The County Court of Vancouver -
No. CC 861751 
Near midnight "a young female" walked by a church building. "A young male" 
person wearing a mask came from among the shrubs and grabbed the girl from 
behind, around the facial area. She screamed, fought and hit him with a paint 
tray she was carrying. The assailant attempted to drag the girl into the 
bushes that were part of the landscape of the church building. She made so 
much noise that passer~-by became aware of what was going on. The assailant 
then released the girl, called her a bitch and fled. 
There was no doubt that the accused was the assailant. He was charged with 
sexual assault. His counsel argued that what occurred amounted to ordinary 
assault only in that the attack was not of a sexual nature or was capable of 
violating the victim's sexual integrity. He implied that what the Crown 
invited the Court to infe r from the circumstances (that when he got in the 
bushes with the girl t.e would have violated her sexual integrity) was no more 
than conjecture. 
The Court rejected the defence's position. Both the accused and his victim 
were young persons; there was no attempt or apparent interest in depriving the 
girl of the wallet she was carrying which fell on the sidewalk during the 
struggle. He pulled her to an area where they would not be seen and in the 
process began to pull her clothing over her head. Said the Court : 
* 
"Combined, these circumstances satisfy 
me beyond a reasonable doubt that this 
attack comes within the definition of 
a sexual assault as outlined . ... in the 
* Queen versus Doltan Chase . " 
Accused convicted of Sexual Assault . 
See "Meaning of Sexual Assault". Supreme Ccurt of Canada decision 
on page 35 of Volume 29 of this publication. 
LEGAL TIO-BITS 
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QUESTIONING OF YOUNG OFFENDER CONTRARY TO Y.0.A. 
------ CONSTITUTIONAL BRF.ACH? 
A c1t1zen alerted police of a break-in in progress in the house next door . 
This report resulted in a description of the culprit . Police spotted a youth 
of similar description nearby. He ran, shedding the stolen property in the 
process. He was apprehended, and was given all his rights. He selected to 
remain mute. During the ride to the station a constable went into the back 
with the youth and questioned him without any result. Needless to say, this 
was unfortunate and unwise in view of the specific provisions of the Y.O. Act 
on this point. The defence claimed this amounted to an infringement of the 
youth's constitutional right and called for a judicial stay of proce(·ciings i1S 
a remedy under s . 24 (1) of the Charter. This was declined as nothing 
resulted from this "unwise" move on the part of the constable. The B.C. Court 
of Appeal agreed that there was no need to decide if there was a 
constitutional breach as no evidence was gained from it. The conviction was 
upheld. 
R. v. X.G.W.S. - B . C. Court of Appeal - Victoria V00553 
November 1987 . 
* * * * * * 
DOES 24 HOURS D.L. SUSPENSION BAR PURSUIT OF 
DRINKING-DRIVING OFFENCES? 
The accused had been stopped and received a 24 hour driver ' s licence 
suspension. He was also charged with impaired driving and uover 80 mlg". He 
relied on s. 26 and 11 of the Charter to have the prosecution for those 
charges stopped . He contended that a driver's licence suspension is a form of 
punishment and that prosecution could lead to be punished twice for the same 
offence. 
The B.C. Court of Appeal held that the 24 hour suspension from driving does 
not constitute punishment. The suspension does not amount to a "charge" which 
s. 11 of the charter includes as a requisite to double jeopardy. 
Accused's appeal dismissed. 
Regina v. ART, B.C . Court of Appeal, Vancouver CA007422 
October 1987 
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PRIVACY "WHILE CONSULTING COUNSEL 
All seemed to go well and in a cooperative fashion when the accused was 
processed for impaired driving. He spoke to his lawyer from a phone booth and 
so did the arresting officer. Yet, the accused refused to blow and gave lack 
of proof that he drove as a reason. At trial and two subsequent appeals by 
the accused regarding his conviction for refusal, that lack of proof was not 
the issue but the open door of the telephone booth was . The officer conceded 
he could hear what the accused said to his lawyer. This was an infringement 
of his right to counsel according to the trial and Appeal Court judges. 
However, the burden of proving that the administration of justice could be 
brought into disrepute if the evidence of the refusal was admitted was on the 
accused , and he had failed to meet that burden. Neither did he demonstrate: 
any connection between the infringement (lack of privacy) and the refusal . 
Furthermore, closing the door of the booth would have been a simple remedy to 
the accused's problem said a County Court Judge . The accused then we nt to 
the B. C. Court of Appeal which refused to grant him leave to appeal. ThP 
Crmm had argued before this Court that there had been no infringement of the 
accused's right to counsel. This was not responded to but it agreed with the 
Appeal Court judge's (County Court) interpretation and application of s. 24 ( 2 ) 
of the Charter . 
Regina v. RIJSIN - B.C . Court of Appeal - Vancouver CA007718 
November 1987 - * For synopses of County Court judgment, see Volume 2 8 , page 
31 of this publication . 
****** 
•ooES ACQUITTAL OF SPEEDING PREVENT ADMISSIBILITY 
OF SPEEDING EVIDENCE IN 'OVER .08 TRIAL' 
The officer worked radar and due to a reading from the car the accused drove , 
the accused was stopped. A demand for breath samples fol lowed and an 
analysis of .180 mlg. resulted. The officer, due to commitment to a higher 
court failed to show for the accused's trial for speeding and a dismissal was 
granted for lack of prosecution. Subsequently, the officer testified at the 
accused's "over .08" trial and told how he had stopped the accused for 
speeding. Defence counsel appealed the accused's conviction to the County 
Court arguing that the officer's grounds to make the demand were the results 
of the stop for speeding. In view of the dismissal, the speeding did not take 
place and that evidence was therefore inadmissible. The County Court Judge 
disagreed. He held the evidence was adduced not to prove the accused was 
speeding, but that the officer believed he was speeding . 
Regina v. KAYE - The County Court of Vancouver - No. CC 842082 -
December 1987 
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